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A PROPER BURIAL 
 
Robert L. Tsai* 
 
In his article, Professor Mark Killenbeck defends both 
Korematsu v. United States1 and Trump v. Hawaii2 on their own 
terms, albeit on narrow grounds.  He goes on to conclude that 
comparisons of the two decisions don’t hold up.  Killenbeck has 
authored a thoughtful and contrarian paper, but I’m not sold.  In 
my view, Korematsu simply isn’t worth saving; in fact, a more 
complete repudiation of the internment decisions is overdue.  
Trump v. Hawaii, too, must also be revisited at the earliest 
opportunity and its more alarming features that abet presidential 
discrimination against non-citizens rejected.  
Moreover, I believe that comparisons between the two 
disputes are warranted.  When the two controversies are brought 
together, they underscore several themes about our prevailing 
constitutional order:  whether during war or peacetime, a 
president can harm politically unpopular minorities through the 
law in a variety of ways, judges consistently have difficulty 
reaching consensus to do anything about the unequal burdens 
imposed by presidential policies on out-groups, and as a result, 
we need stronger reforms that can prevent such harms in the 
future.   
To begin, I’m genuinely puzzled that Killenbeck would 
defend Korematsu as containing a “true core” worth recovering 
from the blatant racial stereotyping and sloppy analysis in the 
decision.  He painstakingly takes apart the analysis offered by 
Justice Hugo Black and agrees with me, as well as the deluge of 
 
       * Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  An earlier version of this essay 
was offered as remarks as part of a symposium on Killenbeck’s paper for the Balkinization 
blog.  My thanks to Victoria Abramchuk and Allie Wainwright for their assistance. 
1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober 
Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV. 151, 155, 158 (2021). 
2. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 156-57.  
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critics over the years,3 that the decision represents not only an 
atrocious failure of reason but also one that ratified racial 
hostility.4  After all that, what’s left to cheer? 
Killenbeck offers two reasons for keeping Korematsu 
around: “[it] is an object lesson in bad faith” and the decision 
provides “the foundations for the doctrine of strict scrutiny.”5  
The first reason, grounded in classroom pedagogy, is 
unobjectionable, and most teachers continue to teach the decision 
for just that reason.  I’m one of them.  Some decisions that no 
longer represent the state of the law are so reprehensible, and 
caused so much social and material pain in their time, that they 
must never be forgotten.  As a matter of civic education, the 
internment cases should be perennially considered and their logic 
eviscerated in classrooms.  The survival of values such as reason 
and equality depend on just this sort of regular performance. 
I’ll focus on Killenbeck’s second reason, which rests on a 
claim about Korematsu’s continuing importance as law.  This 
reason, I believe, collapses when one thinks about it, for what he 
says is valuable about the decision can be found in less tainted 
form elsewhere.  
Let us first address Killenbeck’s claim that strict scrutiny 
somehow represents a moral statement of our political order.  The 
fact that a decision may be useful to judges for a doctrinal purpose 
is hardly a deep moral statement.  Strict scrutiny is nothing more 
than a judge’s instrument and a highly formalistic one at that. 
It is also a device that is routinely dispensed with when it 
becomes an impediment to achieving consensus on a multi-person 
body.  Indeed, the Korematsu majority made a big deal about 
using a form of it, but the approach was nowhere to be found in 
 
3. RICHARD REEVES, INFAMY: THE SHOCKING STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II 232-33 (2015); Neil Gotanda, The Story of Korematsu, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 250 (Michael C. Dorf ed., Found. Press 2004); ERIC K. 
YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT 139-42, 164 (Aspen Publishers ed. 2001); PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 337 
(1983); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 
508-09 (1945). 
4. In PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION, I contend that 
the internment decisions represented “the paradigmatic situation where the usual mode of 
debating equality not only proved disastrous for the principle of equality, but also arguably 
closed off more diligent efforts to do justice.”  ROBERT L. TSAI, PRACTICAL EQUALITY: 
FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION 121-22 (2019). 
5. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 189 
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Trump v. Hawaii because its formalism is effortlessly 
manipulated by nefarious actors to evade accountability.  When 
one wiggles out of having to find an impermissible “purpose,” 
none of the tough tools associated with the mechanism ever come 
into play.  The spectacular ease, moreover, with which Chief 
Justice slips out of heightened review due to context—that the 
decision here involves controlling entry into the country—reveals 
yet another aspect of its on-again, off-again importance.   
Nor is there anything magical about strict scrutiny that 
makes it essential to the defense of individual rights.6  There isn’t 
deep moral insight contained either in the strict scrutiny construct 
or the Korematsu Court’s use of it that couldn’t be extracted from 
elsewhere.  The ideas that racial animus is antithetical to the rule 
of law and violates the principle of equal regard, regardless of 
one’s citizenship, had already been laid down in decisions 
decades before the federal government decided to round up 
people of Japanese ancestry, from cases such as Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins7 or Strauder v. West Virginia.8 
For those who take comfort in formalism, there are any 
number of other rulings that can easily substitute as a signal for 
the proposition that a state official’s use of race triggers strict 
scrutiny, such as Loving v. Virginia.9  They even serve as better 
illustrations of how to do it rigorously.  
In truth, using strict scrutiny reflexively could even be 
counterproductive, by promoting an unthinking refusal to grapple 
with the serious stakes of a constitutional dispute.  I’ve had more 
than my share of students who get tripped up by the mechanics of 
the tiers-of-scrutiny formula and lose sight of the key judgments 
entailed in constitutional interpretation that are compressed, and 
thereby obscured, by the tool.10  
 
6. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006); Adam Winkler, 
Fundamentally Wrong about Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 239 (2006) 
(“[L]aws infringing upon fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny, but only some of 
those rights, only some of the time, and only when challenged by some people.”).  
7. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).  
8. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1880).  
9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
10. I am reminded of Philip Bobbitt’s diagnosis that modern Equal Protection 
jurisprudence has degenerated into “application and commentary revolv[ing] around ‘three 
tiers,’ ‘compelling state interests,’ ‘fundamental rights,’ and ‘suspect classification[s]’ to 
such an extent that” one might suspend judgment altogether and merely use “a chart by which 
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Killenbeck argues that Justice Black’s opinion in Korematsu 
gave “further structure and detail” to the test, which encompassed 
“a retreat from reflexive disparate treatment of aliens” and “the 
gradual embrace of a formal test.”11  Fine, but this kind of 
doctrinal tinkering doesn’t render the decision indispensable as 
law going forward.  
In short, the legal system can carry on just fine without 
Korematsu.  Whatever little doctrinal value it still has can’t be 
extricated from the horrific circumstances or analysis.  What’s 
more, the precedent had already long been reduced to a cheap 
citation for most law clerks in this respect, though it has always 
been an odd—even offensive—choice for such routine labor.  
Korematsu’s demise as precedent happened due to an 
avalanche of moral and legal criticism from academics, activists, 
and government officials.  So, when Chief Justice Roberts finally 
pronounced the precedent dead, that merely recognized that the 
politics of repudiation outside of the courts had, in fact, worked.12  
Killenbeck retells this part of the story in brief but faithful 
fashion, taking pains to point out the ethical lapses on the part of 
government lawyers who refused to apprise the Justices that their 
own intelligence contradicted their sweeping legal assertion that 
Japanese Americans posed a national security threat.13  
On the other side of the ledger, the reasons to no longer treat 
the ruling as law have piled up over the years.  Beyond its status 
as a horrendous instance of judicial reasoning on matters of 
equality, the fact that Korematsu has remained on the books has 
continued to inspire the worst sentiments.  While still on the 
campaign trail in 2015, Donald Trump invoked FDR’s actions in 
proposing a “complete and total shutdown” of Muslims entering 
the country and, when pressed, repeatedly refused to say whether 
the internment decisions violated America’s values.14  His allies 
 
a justice could locate the constitutionality of a challenged statute or ‘unconstitutionality’ by 
following columns of ‘significant interest’ and the like down, and rows of ‘governmental 
interest’ and so forth across.” PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 55 (1982). 
11. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 191. 
12. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).  
13. See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 405-06, 424-
25 (2011); ROBERT L. TSAI, SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE POLITICS OF 
REPUDIATION 35 (Austin Sarat ed., 2020). 
14. Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Cites These FDR Policies to Defend Muslim 
Ban, ABC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015), [https://perma.cc/QW8X-HK22]; Michael Scherer, 
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were not so coy, some of whom happily cited the wartime 
precedent in support of establishing a national registry to track 
Muslim people.15 
For judges and clerks even to sprinkle Korematsu in their 
decisions confused people and kindled hope among bad actors 
that jurists were keeping access available to a narrow path to 
inequality.  If anything, Korematsu deserves to be buried with 
more fanfare than Chief Justice Roberts gave it, tossed out in the 
course of giving a rebuttal to the dissenters’ charges of complicity 
in Trump v. Hawaii.  Look, the majority said, we aren’t willing to 
tolerate animus, and to prove it to you, we are willing to say that 
Korematsu as caselaw is too tainted to be cited and promise never 
to do it again.16  
But if the majority were truly interested in renouncing race-
based decision-making and close the loopholes that allow 
government officials to engage in it, then why didn’t they also 
toss out Hirabayashi v. United States?  That ruling permitted a 
race-based curfew.17  By getting rid of Korematsu without driving 
a stake in the heart of Hirabayashi leaves open the inference that 
certain kinds of sweeping race-based measures may still be 
permissible. 
Pedagogically, the current state of doctrinal uncertainty 
elevates the need to teach the curfew decision to tease out what, 
if anything, survives as law.  For instance, can race or religion be 
used to harm a minority population during a time of war?  If so, 
what about threats or priorities that fall short of live conflict—
such as race-based quarantine rules or religion-based counter-
terrorism policies?  In the future, when can other political 
minorities, especially non-citizens, expect to receive 
constitutional protection when a president openly announces his 
intention to do members of the group harm?  
 
Exclusive: Donald Trump Says He Might Have Supported Japanese Internment, TIME (Dec. 
8, 2015), [https://perma.cc/B36N-42SU].  
15. Abigail Abrams, Donald Trump Advocate Cites Japanese Internment Camps as 
‘Precedent’ for Muslim Registry, TIME (Nov. 17, 2016), [https://perma.cc/MB3D-YA37]. 
16. Chief Justice Roberts initially accused the dissenters of taking “rhetorical 
advantage” of Korematsu and insisted that it “has nothing to do with this case.”  Trump, 138 
S. Ct. at 2423.  He then went on to state that the decision “was gravely wrong the day it was 
decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—’has no place in law 
under the Constitution.”  Id. 
17. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 102 (1943). 
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*** 
Let’s turn to Killenbeck’s defense of Trump v. Hawaii on the 
merits.  Here, his support is tentative and procedural, resting on 
the fact that the case “was decided with an incomplete record” as 
well as uncertainty as to “exactly how [the ban] has operated and 
what its actual impact has been.”18  Killenbeck breathes a sigh of 
relief because the ruling has “the arguable virtue of not pretending 
that it has anything to do with heightened scrutiny.”19 
All of this is true as far as it goes.  But it offers comfort only 
in the sense that the Court could have created more havoc with 
doctrine than it did.  What Killenbeck misses is that the Court 
failed to take advantage of the opportunity to stake out an 
approach that addresses the recurring problems that will surely 
continue to arise.  After all, we will see more demagogues in the 
future.  They will also continue to enjoy expert assistance in 
scrubbing their illicit programs to make them more presentable.  
While judges can’t stop those who lack civic virtue from rising to 
power, they do bear some responsibility for minimizing the 
damage.  Merely regurgitating and applying rationality review is 
understandably alarming for the millions of people with family 
members who live in other countries. 
Killenbeck works hard to wring some good news out of the 
decision, but it has the feel of damage control.  Killenbeck thinks 
it’s a close call but that the Court’s decision is defensible given 
some uncertainty in the record.  Here he rests heavily on the facial 
neutrality of the ban. 
I agree that the ruling on the merits is defensible, but only if 
one takes as given an exceedingly broad view of executive 
discretion over immigration (existing doctrine does give a 
president deference when he acts pursuant to congressional 
authority to exclude foreigners) and then closes one’s eyes to 
plentiful evidence of religious hostility.  But we need not accept 
all of that as written in stone.  
It’s worth noting that the years-long detention of Japanese 
Americans caused untold suffering for more than a hundred 
 
18. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 202, 205. 
19. Id. at 197.  For other, more robust defenses of Trump v. Hawaii, see William P. 
Barr, The Role of the Executive, 43 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 605 (2020); Joshua Kemme, 
Protecting Religion vs. Protecting Lives: The “Travel Ban,” 45 N. KY. L. REV. 217 (2018). 
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thousand people:  lost homes, businesses, wages, and educational 
opportunities, as well as geographic dislocation and 
intergenerational shame. Women gave birth in stables within the 
makeshift detention camps.  Armed men and barbed wire policed 
their existence.   
But what we know now about Japanese Americans’ 
suffering doesn’t make the suffering of Muslims affected by the 
multi-nation ban insignificant.  The travel ban also caused 
material losses and social pain on a massive scale, though it has 
been harder to quantify because the people whose lives have been 
disrupted for the past four years are scattered across the world.  
There has been no systematic effort to assess the transnational 
toll, and these human and material costs often remain out of view 
of jurists focused so intently on the immediate parties before 
them.  We are talking of loved ones kept apart, missed jobs and 
university degrees, and the stigma of being branded dangerous 
because of factors that lie beyond their control—many of the 
same things that today cause people to see wartime internment as 
a travesty. 
Instead of thinking of what is merely defensible, it’s worth 
considering what might start to approach the ideal.  On that score, 
Trump v. Hawaii falls woefully short.  It neither puts any serious 
roadblocks to religious bigotry nor helps us to smoke out policies 
designed to impose unequal burdens on hated minorities through 
surreptitious or complex means.  If anything, Chief Justice 
Roberts created new problems by invoking the First Amendment 
seemingly to insulate some of a president’s xenophobic and anti-
Muslim remarks, instead of characterizing what he had before 
him as probative evidence of religious animus.20  
He does, however, accord significance to the 
administration’s later choice to take Iraq off the list of banned 
countries, saying oddly that it was “difficult to see how exempting 
one of the largest predominantly Muslim countries . . . can be 
cited as evidence of animus toward Muslims.”21  In other words, 
the Justices found excuses to discount evidence of pernicious 
intent right in front of their eyes while demanding more complete 
 
20. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418, 2420-21 (2018). 
21. Id. at 2421. 
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evidence of bias, such as worldwide harm,22 before drawing a 
negative inference against the president.  
What never changed, from the moment Trump proposed a 
Muslim ban as a candidate to the moment he celebrated the 
Supreme Court’s 5-4 endorsement of his policy, was the 
president’s perception that he wanted to treat Muslim people 
differently than people of other faiths.  Nor did his message 
change as the policy went through different iterations, other than 
to grouse that his lawyers made him “water” it down.  He never 
once renounced his odious goal.  The original slate of countries 
were 97% Muslim, which meant that they served as excellent 
proxies for religion.23 
That the administration worked from a list that the Obama 
administration had once used is a red herring.  The key is why did 
Trump and his aides settle on the countries they did and whether 
they could justify doing so now, rather than why a previous set of 
officials designed the policy they did.  
Although the ban went through a few changes, it didn’t 
change all that much.  The bulk of the countries banned stayed the 
same; a couple were later added as fig leaves.  This told us that 
once he got into office, President Trump was willing to accept a 
partial religious ban dressed up by his lawyers to appear more 
acceptable to judges.  The facial neutrality that lawyers seized 
upon to defend the policy was seen as a sham by the president 
himself, in whom “[t]he executive Power [is] vested.”24  
What kind of judicial decision could be described as better 
than merely defensible?  One that denied the president an 
opportunity to crow that he had given his supporters the Muslim 
ban that was promised and thereby fan the flames of anti-Islamic 
prejudice.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court validated his effort 
to rally anti-Muslim sentiment in the country through a display of 
sheer ingenuousness and signaled to others that it was permissible 
to mimic his barely-disguised inegalitarian behavior.  
 
22. Not only does Chief Justice Roberts seize on the fact that the policy’s “text says 
nothing about religion,” he also states that the fact that “the policy covers just 8% of the 
world’s Muslim population” should be counted against any inference of religious animus.  
Id.  But it is not a requirement that every single member of a group be harmed before an 
intent to harm can be drawn. 
23. Alan Gomez & Richard Wolf, Federal Appeals Court Skeptical of Trump’s Travel 
Ban, USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2017), [https://perma.cc/X7GT-WWBK]. 
24. U.S. CONST. art. II. 
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Denying these consequences could have easily been 
accomplished without tying up a president’s statutory authority to 
exclude in the future.  One option would have been to engage in 
a Cleburne-style gloss on rational basis review in this setting by 
rejecting the evidence of national security concerns for justifying 
blanket travel bans from these particular countries.25  Such an 
approach would have the benefit of invalidating the president’s 
policy without branding him a religious bigot, if this is what stood 
in the way.  The Justices did not take this option, though it was a 
plausible one under the exceedingly deferential Mandel 
framework created for visa denial situations.26  True reform is 
needed to deal with ideological and status-based discrimination 
in this context, but that is a discussion for another time.27 
Another option would have been to find religious animus 
explicitly by invoking the line of cases from the domestic religion 
context.28  That would have put the Court in greatest rhetorical 
tension with the sitting president, but that too would have done a 
better job of juggling the various principles in play than blind 
deference. 
Killenbeck contends that the evidence of animus is less 
plentiful in Trump v. Hawaii, but he never quite says the evidence 
is insufficient.  It’s true, as Killenbeck points out, that the record 
in Korematsu “made it abundantly and undeniably clear that the 
government actions at issue targeted, and affected, only persons 
of Japanese ancestry.”29  By contrast, the challengers’ theory in 
the travel ban case was that the policy was drafted to accomplish 
inequality by other means.30  If we care about illicit objectives, 
we have to work harder and be willing to look behind the labors 
of clever lawyers when they draw up a facially neutral policy.  
 
25. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).  
26. Under Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), judges ask only whether an 
immigration policy is “facially legitimate and bona fide.”  For a terrific examination of the 
president’s ascendant power to make immigration law, see ADAM B. COX & CRISTINA M. 
RODRÍGUEZ, THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION LAW (2020). 
27. See generally JULIA ROSE KRAUT, THREAT OF DISSENT: A HISTORY OF 
IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2020). 
28. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
29. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 221 
30. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018).  
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But to say that the president’s own consistent and plentiful 
expressions of religious bigotry are merely cynical and should be 
discounted is to say that serious equal protection challenges can 
no longer be successful unless policymakers are too obvious or 
stupid about their nefarious designs.  
Chief Justice Roberts’ remark that Korematsu “has been 
overruled in the court of history” left many other problematic 
features of the internment cases undisturbed.31  That leaves open 
not only questions about the sincerity of the enterprise (though I 
don’t doubt that the justices are unlikely to cite Korematsu in the 
future), but also its completeness.  First, as mentioned earlier, the 
remaining internment decisions were left intact.  
Second, nothing was said about Ex Parte Endo, which had 
declared that as a matter of statutory law, a concededly loyal 
individual could not continue to be held in the internment camp 
and must be released.32  Because that ruling reached only the 
question of continued confinement of individuals, it did not alter 
either Hirabayashi’s or Korematsu’s affirmance of broad-scale 
measures that turned on race, much less the constitutionality of 
internment policy in the first instance.33  
The problem with leaving Hirabayashi intact and Ex Parte 
Endo unmodified is that these precedents continue to empower 
anyone who might wish to engage in mass targeting or removal 
of undesirables.  A plausible reading of precedent still seems to 
be that a president can get away with acting first—including 
possibly using race or some other immutable characteristic if the 
need is great enough—and facing consequences later.   
*** 
There’s quite a bit more that can be gleaned from putting 
Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii together rather than 
contemplating them apart.  We learn that, two generations after 
the internment cases were decided, a president’s ability to inflict 
mass suffering has grown exponentially, rather than diminished.  
His arsenal has also expanded, as new bureaucracies such as the 
 
31. Id. at 2423. 
32. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944). 
33. Id. at 297; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). 
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Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement have emerged, allowing for awesome displays of 
state power domestically.  These bureaucracies, with their own 
staff and lawyers, can hunt down undesirables and facilitate life-
saving care and path-altering opportunities or they can crush them 
in cruel fashion.  Agents from one department can also be 
repurposed for domestic law enforcement activities, such as 
quelling protests.34  
What’s worse, when executive branch actors decide to rev 
up that immense power to harm out-groups, they possess the 
means to cover their tracks.  DeWitt didn’t feel the need to hide 
his anti-Japanese bigotry because he probably felt the sentiment 
was widely shared in his day.35  In our own time, it has become 
less acceptable to be open about racial or religious animus so we 
should expect to see less overt expressions of bigotry, and that’s 
to be commended.  But it’s also a simpler task for presidential 
aides to evade subpoenas or the media, obscure their roles in 
developing policy, relying on a many-hands approach that insists 
any single nefarious actor’s objective has somehow been blunted 
by the participation of others.  We need better legal doctrine that 
anticipates the executive branch’s enhanced capacity to hide 
evidence of their malfeasance.  
The incentives for an administration to mistreat political 
minorities, too, have grown, as popular movements roil American 
life once again.  Citizens’ faith in establishment figures and social 
organizations wanes, and ordinary people search for strong 
leaders—and even strong men—capable of vanquishing their 
ideological adversaries.  Militant times call for a more responsive 
judiciary. 
But legal constraints have not kept pace.  Our laws and 
institutions have proven largely ineffective in preventing 
demagogues from acquiring power, or a president hellbent on 
harming a political minority from using the law to do so.  To the 
contrary, judges have done more harm than good by either 
explicitly insulating pernicious politics or hiding behind the 
complexities of the modern administrative state.  Much of current 
 
34. Mike Baker et al., Federal Agents Push into Portland Streets, Stretching Limits of 
Their Authority, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020), [https://perma.cc/3NNP-3RMK]. 
35. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 173-74. 
318 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:2 
legal doctrine has been fashioned with technocrats and publicly-
spirited officials in mind, not would-be autocrats or leaders of 
ethno-nationalist movements.  It continues to be maintained in 
this way, without taking into account how much our politics has 
changed.  That has rendered judges not only ineffectual when it 
matters the most, but mere adjuncts to inegalitarian policies.   
One of those legacies of these years of turmoil may be more 
individuals who run for office as standard bearers of right-wing 
or left-wing social movements, or on behalf of conspiracy-based 
communities, with all of the attendant problems such dynamics 
entail.  Both FDR and Trump projected themselves as leaders of 
a burgeoning movement of their time.  FDR threw his arms 
around the labor movement and forged a coalition whose 
achievements were driven primarily by the economic needs of 
white Americans.36  Black civil rights issues were made a 
secondary priority, while Asian Americans, not yet politically 
active enough to be a force, comprised a tiny fraction of that 
coalition.  When white supporters on the West Coast pushed hard 
for the internment of Japanese people in part because of enduring 
antagonism over economic competition, the lives and welfare of 
Japanese immigrants became dispensable to the federal 
government.   
Trump’s “America First” nationalist movement fused white 
supremacist beliefs and paramilitary elements with mainstream 
supporters anxious about America’s changing demographics and 
culture.  From the first day of his campaign to the last days of his 
presidency, Trump reminded people that foreigners, people with 
non-conforming religious practices, and anti-police brutality 
activists were to be treated as enemies of the political community, 
while those loyal to a muscular notion of capitalist-libertarian 
 
36. “The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our 
civilization[,]” FDR roared at his first inaugural address on March 4, 1933.  “We may now 
restore that temple to the ancient truths.”  For FDR, “[o]ur greatest primary task is to put 
people to work.”  Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in LILLIAN 
GOLDMAN L. LIBR., YALE L. SCH., [https://perma.cc/NH4T-9S5J].  By 1944, he was looking 
backward at the achievements of the labor movement and forward to finishing the fight 
against America’s enemies abroad.  When he presented “a second Bill of Rights,” he began 
with “the right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines 
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recreation[.]”  Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress (Jan. 11, 
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freedom and to the president himself were its friends.  Most of his 
signature policies and his public rhetoric, along with his corrupt 
actions, underscored this friend-enemy distinction.  He may not 
have taken his anti-Muslim program much further given other 
priorities, but he proved to be the highest-ranking elected official 
to take the culture war directly to this out-group.  For that, he will 
always be remembered for what is possible. 
Judges don’t often think enough about how future lawyers 
and ordinary people will use and misuse their decisions.  They 
should.  The fact of the matter is that once the highest court in the 
land endorses a policy, much less the cherished project of a 
movement figure, it is then teed up as a plan for future action.  
When the Supreme Court showed little resistance to the 
mistreatment of strangers, more policies came down the pike.  An 
emboldened president followed up his victory in the Muslim ban 
case by implementing a raft of policies restricting access to 
asylum and visas, limiting what immigration law judges could do, 
and seeking to punish communities with non-citizens by 
undercounting them for the Census.  All of these actions were 
foreseeable if you understand Trump was a movement president 
who understood himself to be pushing legal limits.  
His administration cited the Muslim ban to justify a number 
of these moves.  Other judges, too, soon got into the act.  The 
Ninth Circuit, relying on Trump v. Hawaii, later upheld President 
Trump’s ban on the entry of foreigners without pre-approved 
health insurance, validating anti-egalitarian policies in a new 
context.37  
Another concern raised in both controversies is the risk of 
manufactured emergencies.  As I have defined elsewhere, a fake 
crisis is one where a public policy problem’s “nature or scope is 
fabricated or exaggerated beyond reasonable parameters.”38  In 
Korematsu, the United States was engaged in a very real hot war 
against Japan, but the asserted threat posed by Americans of 
Japanese ancestry was grossly exaggerated.  Some within the 
administration tried hard to manufacture evidence of espionage 
 
37. John Doe #1 v. Trump, 984 F.3d 848, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2020). 
38. Robert L. Tsai, Manufactured Emergencies, 129 YALE L.J.F. 590, 592 (2020).  A 
notable departure from this somnambulant judicial approach toward presidential dissembling 
can be found in the census decision, which I discuss at some length in Equality is a Brokered 
Idea, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1 (2020). 
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but couldn’t find much of anything; credulous judges ate up even 
the thin gruel presented.  
Likewise, Trump v. Hawaii turned on whether the 
government could credibly show that the designation of certain 
majority-Muslim countries for blanket exclusions could be 
empirically justified.  On this score, the justices in the majority 
showed themselves to be entirely too trusting by accepting partial 
and conclusory evidence of a threat.  Their approach makes it a 
simple task for mendacious officials to get their way in the future.  
In terms of how power is actually wielded, FDR’s 
constitutional sins may lean toward omission rather than 
commission while Trump’s involve the pursuit of an illicit vision 
from the get-go.  But both testify to the enormous power the 
modern executive branch possesses to inflict harm on unpopular 
minorities.  Instead of strictly supervising inferiors, FDR deferred 
to his Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Lieutenant General 
John DeWitt, who relied on exceedingly thin evidence that 
Japanese Americans posed a real risk to national security.39  In 
that sense, the threat from Japan was real and imminent, but the 
danger from people of Japanese ancestry living in America had 
been largely fabricated.  As Killenbeck reminds us, DeWitt was 
quite open about his prejudiced belief that “[a] Jap’s a Jap,” that 
the “racial strains are undiluted” in people born with Japanese 
ancestry no matter how long a person had lived in the United 
States, and that “an exact separation of the ‘sheep from the goats’ 
was unfeasible.”40  Working within the structure created by 
Congress, lawmaking power was delegated to military officials to 
govern the streets, which was then deployed in ways that singled 
out people of Japanese ancestry for special sanctions. 
By comparison, President Trump was transparent about his 
inegalitarian designs from the outset.  He demanded that his aides 
fulfill his number one campaign promise and populated key posts 
with people like Jeff Sessions, Stephen Miller, Mike Pompeo, and 
(briefly) Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, who shared his anti-Muslim 
beliefs.  Examined in this light, we actually have a more 
 
39. IRONS, supra note 3, at 57-58. 
40. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 162, 172; Harrison Smith, Aiko Herzig Yoshinaga, 
Whose Research Led to Internment Reparations, Dies at 93, WASH. POST (July 26, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/2P6D-BNPE]. 
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compelling portrait of high-level responsibility for policies 
devised to inflict unequal harm.  In fact, a former lawyer from the 
Office of Legal Counsel expressed regret for her role in 
whitewashing religious bias.  She was refreshingly honest, saying 
that her own “portfolio . . . included matters targeting 
noncitizens.”41  She acknowledged that even the successive bans 
were “discriminatory” but that more time with lawyers “narrowed 
them but also made them more technocratic and therefore harder 
for the courts to block” under existing doctrine.42 
By upholding a blanket policy that fell unequally on a single 
group, both Supreme Court decisions did something else that was 
similar:  they raised the costs of ferreting out discrimination.  Just 
as the internment rulings allowed the government to round people 
up and forced loyal citizens to sue for release by demanding a writ 
of habeas corpus, so too the Muslim ban decision forced 
individuals affected by the ban to show bias in her own case, or 
to prove the existence of so pervasive a pattern of visa denials that 
discrimination must be inferred.  We may never know how many 
Muslim people were discouraged by the bans from even seeking 
a visa.  Whether individual lawsuits can prevail at all remains to 
be seen, but there’s little doubt that pushing equality-based claims 
almost exclusively into the as-applied format has made them 
harder and more expensive to litigate.43  For most, it won’t even 
be worth the effort.  President Trump’s efforts, with the 
cooperation of the High Court, ensured that the ban remained 
intact for his entire presidency.  
The bottom line:  from the perspective of egalitarianism, 
both Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii made things worse by 
making it easier for government officials to disregard their 
obligations. 
I want to be clear about something:  Killenbeck in no way 
endorses presidential harassment of unpopular minorities.  Nor 
does he embrace authoritarianism or any other anti-democratic 
 
41. Erica Newland, I’m Haunted by What I Did as a Lawyer in the Trump Justice 
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43. Plaintiffs would have to rely on Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886), 
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ethos.  In fact, if anything, what separates us may be his faith that 
getting rules right will mean that decisionmakers will get 
outcomes right.  But I fear that his telescoped defense of these 
two cases may wind up replicating approaches and habits that 
prevent us from seeing the whole picture or the need for reform.  
And that dismal picture remains one where presidents enjoy 
largely unrestrained authority to harm unpopular minorities, 
while other institutions stand idly by.  
